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THE NEEDLE AND THE DAMAGE DONE:  
MITCHELL V. WISCONSIN’S SWEEPING RULE FOR 
WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAWS ON UNCONSCIOUS 
DUI SUSPECTS  
Dyllan Taxman* 
INTRODUCTION 
In a normal year, the annual death toll from drunk driving accidents in the 
United States will roughly equal the total number of victims of the September 11th 
terrorist attacks and service members killed in the War on Terror combined.1  And 
while every state has enacted increasingly progressive laws to prevent and punish 
driving under the influence (DUI),2 episodes of drunk driving remain consistent year 
to year and less than one percent of self-reported drunk drivers are arrested.3  
Drunken and drugged driving is, both in lay terms and legally speaking,4 a 
compelling public issue.  But the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does 
not discriminate based on the social cost of specific criminal activity, or at least it 
ought not to.  That is why the Supreme Court’s 2019 plurality opinion in Mitchell v. 
 
 © 2020 Dyllan Taxman.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute 
copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy 
identifies the author, provides a citation to Notre Dame Law Review Reflection, and includes this 
provision and copyright notice. 
 * Law Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; Ensign, United States 
Navy Reserve; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison.   
The opinions expressed in this Essay are the author’s own and do not reflect the views or positions 
of the United States Courts or United States Navy. 
 1 Compare DIV. OF UNINTENTIONAL INJURY PREVENTION, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 
POLICY IMPACT: ALCOHOL IMPAIRED DRIVING 3 (2011), https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety 
/pdf/PolicyImpact-Alcohol-a.pdf, with US & Allied Killed, WATSON INST. INT’L & PUB. AFF., 
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/military/killed (last updated Jan. 2020), and 
Brad Plumer, Nine Facts About Terrorism in the United States Since 9/11, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/09/11/nine-facts-about-terrorism-
in-the-united-states-since-911/. 
 2 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DEP’T OF TRANSP., ALCOHOL AND 
HIGHWAY SAFETY: A REVIEW OF THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE 2, 165–213 (2011), https:// 
www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/811374.pdf.  Crimes involving driving an automobile under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol, while given different names across the country, are collectively 
referred to as DUI in this Essay. 
 3 See DIV. OF UNINTENTIONAL INJURY PREVENTION, supra note 1, at 4. 
 4 Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 19 (1979).  
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Wisconsin5 may have come as a shock to those who study criminal law and 
procedure. 
Six years after rejecting any per se warrant exception for blood draws in DUI 
investigations, the Mitchell plurality blesses virtually all warrantless blood draws on 
unconscious DUI suspects.  This Essay analyzes and critiques the Mitchell plurality 
opinion, examining warrantless blood draw caselaw before 2019 and evaluating 
Mitchell against that precedent.  Part I summarizes Mitchell.  Part II examines 
Mitchell as a departure from precedent and an attempt to create law through the rose-
tinted lens of public policy. 
I.     MITCHELL V. WISCONSIN 
Mitchell is a watershed DUI exigency case in which the impaired driver was 
never seen in his car and no party argued for the exigency warrant exception to 
apply.6  Sheboygan police found Gerald Mitchell slurring and stumbling near a lake 
after receiving a tip that he was driving drunk in his van.7  The officers administered 
a breath test showing Mitchell was past the legal blood alcohol content (BAC) limit 
and took him to the police station for a more reliable test.8 
But on the way to the station, Mitchell became unconscious and unable to 
perform another breath test, leading the officers to take him to the hospital for a 
blood draw to determine his BAC, which again measured above the legal limit.9  The 
blood draw was administered while Mitchell was still unconscious.10  Mitchell was 
charged with DUI and moved to suppress the results of the BAC test as an 
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.11  For its part, the 
government prevailed in defending the blood draw in state court, arguing 
Wisconsin’s implied consent law permitted the warrantless search where an 
unconscious Mitchell had not revoked consent to the blood test under the statute.12 
Wisconsin’s thirty-four-year-old implied consent law deems any Wisconsin 
motorist in the act of driving as having consented to breath, blood, and urine testing 
to determine the presence or quantity of alcohol in their blood.13  A motorist 
suspected of DUI can refuse a BAC test and face the suspension of their driver’s 
license.14  The suspendee is entitled to a hearing in which they may argue the 
 
 5 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019).  
 6 See generally id. 
 7 Id. at 2532. 
 8 Id.  This is standard procedure, as a station-administered breath test with a more 
sophisticated device provides better evidence in a subsequent indictment and trial.  See id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 See id. 
 13 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 343.305(2) (West 2019). 
 14 Id. § 343.305(9)(a). 
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investigating officer lacked probable cause to request a BAC test.15  A series of U.S. 
Supreme Court cases have consistently upheld this form of summary civil penalty 
for failure to submit to a BAC test against constitutional challenge.16 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed Mitchell’s conviction, holding that (1) 
by driving on Wisconsin roads and giving police probable cause to suspect Mitchell 
had a prohibited BAC, he voluntarily consented to a blood draw per the implied 
consent statute, and (2) Mitchell voluntarily forfeited the opportunity to withdraw 
consent by drinking to the point of unconsciousness.17  The implied consent statute 
creates a presumption that an unconscious motorist has not withdrawn consent.18  
Examining the totality of the circumstances—particularly Mitchell’s self-induced 
extreme drunkenness rendering a verbal withdrawal or another form of BAC testing 
impossible—the Wisconsin Supreme Court found the statute’s presumption was not 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.19 
Mitchell petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review his case, again arguing 
the warrantless blood draw was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.20  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.  Wisconsin again argued 
in support of the implied consent statute, maintaining that the circumstances of the 
case did not warrant applying the exigency exception to the warrant requirement.21  
But as the legal world waited for the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether 
implied consent laws permitted warrantless blood draws on unconscious DUI 
suspects, four Justices saw a different justification for the search.22 
Justice Alito’s plurality opinion boldly proclaims that, absent extraordinary 
circumstances, a DUI suspect’s unconsciousness always creates an emergency 
excusing law enforcement from obtaining a warrant.23  In Missouri v. McNeely, the 
Supreme Court found that the dissipation of alcohol in blood is not sufficient to 
create an exigency negating the need for a warrant to conduct a blood draw.24  
Instead, the totality of the circumstances surrounding a DUI investigation must 
demonstrate that “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement 
so compelling that a warrantless [blood draw] is objectively reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.”25  The Mitchell plurality accurately describes policing drunk 
 
 15 Id. § 343.305(9)(a)(5)(a).  Suspended motorists have other potential defenses, but the 
issues in a revocation hearing are very limited. 
 16 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563–64 (1983) (holding refusal to submit 
to BAC test can be used in subsequent criminal trial); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18–19 
(1979) (finding no due process violation where driver was arrested on probable cause); Schmerber 
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (holding no violation of right against self-incrimination). 
 17 See State v. Mitchell, 914 N.W.2d 151, 167 (Wis. 2018).  
 18 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 343.305(3)(b) (West 2019). 
 19 Mitchell, 914 N.W.2d at 165. 
 20 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019) (No. 
18-6210). 
 21 Brief of the Respondent at 52, Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. 2525. 
 22 See Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2534–37 (2019). 
 23 See id. at 2539. 
 24 Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 165 (2013) (plurality opinion). 
 25 Id. at 148–49 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)). 
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driving as a “vital public interest” on which laws and policies limiting permitted 
BAC on the roads have a significant impact.26  This demands effective and 
admissible BAC testing, which the plurality—again, accurately—acknowledges 
requires blood draws when a suspect cannot give a breath sample.27 
Determining that this “compelling interest” creates a “compelling need” to 
blood test a DUI suspect who cannot provide a breath sample, the plurality declares 
a warrantless blood draw on an unconscious driver meets the first prong of 
McNeely.28  But for a constitutional warrantless search pursuant to the exigency 
exception, there must also be “no time to secure a warrant.”29  Schmerber v. 
California established that a car accident can create an emergency situation where 
police may be required to attend to medical and traffic safety concerns and do not 
have time to obtain a warrant.30  The Mitchell plurality holds that an unconscious 
DUI suspect always presents an emergency equivalent to the car accident in 
Schmerber, finding that a driver’s unconsciousness 
is itself a medical emergency.  It means that the suspect will have to be rushed to 
the hospital or similar facility not just for the blood test itself but for urgent 
medical care.  Police can reasonably anticipate that such a driver might require 
monitoring, positioning, and support on the way to the hospital; that his blood 
may be drawn anyway, for diagnostic purposes, immediately on arrival; and that 
immediate medical treatment could delay (or otherwise distort the results of) a 
blood draw conducted later, upon receipt of a warrant, thus reducing its 
evidentiary value.31 
Not only do unconscious drivers create a Schmerber-type emergency, Justice 
Alito continues, but they actually create a “more acute” exigency than car wrecks.32  
Because a driver so drunk as to lose consciousness is particularly likely to crash and 
create the type of exigency from Schmerber, the plurality believes the likelihood of 
a traffic accident is an added factor in favor of exigency in all unconscious-driver 
cases.33  Neither would the Court be convinced by Mitchell’s argument that 
technological advances now permit officers to easily obtain a warrant en route to a 
hospital, a point Wisconsin conceded in admitting police had time to secure a 
warrant in the case.34  Instead, the plurality found that “forcing police to put off other 
tasks for even a relatively short period of time may have terrible collateral costs.”35 
 
 26 Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2535. 
 27 See id. at 2535–37. 
 28 See id. 
 29 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)). 
 30 See 384 U.S. 757, 770–71 (1966). 
 31 Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2537–38 (footnotes omitted). 
 32 Id. at 2538. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See id. at 2538–39; id. at 2541 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 35 Id. at 2539 (plurality opinion). 
162 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  R E F L E C T I O N  [VOL. 95:4 
II.     WHY MITCHELL GETS IT WRONG 
A.   “Compelling Need” 
The plurality’s finding that the “compelling need” to effectively combat DUI 
meets the first requirement from McNeely is a gross misstatement of the law.  
Mitchell bases its “compelling need” discussion entirely on public policy, engaging 
in a lengthy recitation of the social costs of drunk driving and the need for effective 
BAC testing to mitigate against them.  But that is simply not what McNeely and 
other exigency cases require.  The Fourth Amendment’s protections do not diminish 
in the face of social needs, and courts should decline to craft exceptions to the 
warrant requirement based on “fear mongering” and a desire to eradicate specific 
criminal behavior, no matter how enticing it may be from a policy perspective.36  
Instead, a “compelling need” must arise from the actual emergency in a specific 
investigation, determined under the totality of the circumstances. 
McNeely’s “compelling need” prong does not simply refer to particular 
criminal behavior creating a compelling public interest in investigation and 
prosecution, as the Mitchell plurality would have readers believe.  Rather, police 
may conduct a warrantless search only when “exigencies of the situation make the 
needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless [blood draw] is 
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”37  The “compelling need” 
refers to the exigencies of the situation, not the general need to effectively police a 
specific crime.  Mitchell’s analysis distorts that element.  The plurality begins by 
describing a “compelling interest” in combatting drunk driving, then shifts , with no 
further explanation or support, to describing the same policy factors as creating a 
“compelling need” for a warrantless search.38  While a reader would be hard pressed 
to disagree with Justice Alito’s description of the “vital public interest” in 
eliminating DUI, a “compelling interest” in eliminating a class of criminal behavior 
is simply not the same as particular exigent circumstances in a case creating a 
“compelling need” to search without a warrant. 
That analysis is wholly inconsistent with traditionally excepted exigent 
circumstances.  For example, police may enter a burning building without a  warrant 
to put out a fire and investigate its cause.39  The compelling need in such a case 
derives from the nature of the specific circumstances—the fire and its inherent 
capacity to injure a building’s inhabitants and destroy evidence—not a compelling 
public interest in investigating arson generally.  Similarly, the compelling need to 
conduct a warrantless blood draw on an unconscious driver must arise from the 
exigencies of the particular circumstance, not the general need to perform BAC tests 
on an entire class of DUI suspects in all cases.  Indeed, this is why McNeely 
 
 36 See id. at 2548 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 37 Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148–49 (2013) (plurality opinion) (quoting Kentucky 
v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)). 
 38 See Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2536–37. 
 39 Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978). 
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specifically mandates that the reasonableness of a warrantless blood draw is 
determined by the circumstances in the particular case.40 
If there is a “compelling need” justifying an exigency-excepted search 
whenever a DUI suspect cannot give a breath test, then why stop at unconscious 
suspects?  The plurality’s justification opens the floodgates to an Orwellian “parade 
of horribles.”  The analysis is equally persuasive for a suspect who merely withdraws 
consent to a breath test.  Such a warrantless search would be entirely consistent with 
Mitchell’s rationale that there is a compelling need to blood test DUI suspects who 
cannot provide a breath sample.  It would also fly in the face of the Supreme Court’s 
precedent emphasizing increased Fourth Amendment protections against 
warrantless blood draws compared to breath tests41 and upholding implied consent 
laws because they provide only civil penalties for withdrawing consent.42  The 
plurality’s line of reasoning should also allow police to enter a DUI suspect’s home 
without a warrant upon probable cause that they drove drunk.  The public interest in 
arresting such a suspect is equally compelling, and administering a breath test 
pursuant to implied consent laws equally impossible.  Entering the home is no 
greater a Fourth Amendment intrusion than conducting a medical procedure on an 
unconscious and unwilling citizen.  Absent a specific emergency, it is hard to believe 
our Constitution would permit the former.  Incredibly, it now permits the latter. 
B.   “No Time to Secure a Warrant” 
A compelling need is an insufficient basis to blood test an unconscious DUI 
suspect without a warrant.  The Supreme Court’s precedent in McNeely requires that 
an officer has no time to secure a warrant.  The Mitchell plurality’s analysis reaches 
to find that there is never time to secure a warrant when an unconscious driver must 
be taken to the hospital.  Schmerber defined the circumstances under which officers 
lack time to secure a warrant, and the Mitchell plurality misconstrues its requirement 
by inexplicably erasing a predicate condition.  The plurality goes on to shore up its 
position by alleging an additional exigency factor when a DUI subject is 
unconscious—the likelihood of a traffic accident—which belies its untenable 
conclusion and departure from precedent.  
Any time an unconscious driver is suspected of DUI, Mitchell declares police 
are confronted with a medical emergency eliminating the need for a warrant.  This 
is a misconstruction of Schmerber’s limited holding that the circumstances in that 
case, where police were responding to a traffic accident, presented pressing concerns 
that could reasonably take priority over obtaining a warrant.  The Mitchell plurality 
inexplicably interprets Schmerber as creating a per se rule permitting a warrantless 
blood draw in all but the most routine DUI investigations.  It simply ignores 
Schmerber’s limited applicability based on circumstances surrounding a particular 
 
 40 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149. 
 41 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016). 
 42 Id. at 2185 (citing McNeely, 569 U.S. at 159; South Dakota v. Neville, 459  
U.S. 553, 560 (1983)). 
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investigation.  Expanding Schmerber to permit warrantless blood draws without a 
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis or even similar circumstances to that case, i.e., 
a traffic accident, is particularly troubling given that Schmerber was decided in 
1966, before police had the ability to obtain warrants en route to a hospital using a 
mobile phone.  In fact, Wisconsin conceded that police could have obtained a 
warrant before drawing Gerald Mitchell’s blood.  Yet, despite this admission, the 
Mitchell plurality assures readers that police could not reasonably have obtained a 
warrant simply because they needed to take Mitchell to a hospital. 
Interpreting Schmerber to obviate the warrant requirement whenever police 
may need to take a suspect to a hospital is wholly inconsistent with precedent.  
Indeed, in McNeely, police drew blood from a very conscious McNeely at a hospital, 
merely because he refused a breath test.43  But the totality of the circumstances in 
that case did not demonstrate that police lacked time to secure a warrant, showing a 
hospital trip does not by itself preclude obtaining a warrant.  Depending on policy, 
some jurisdictions might always require a suspect to be taken to a hospital for a 
blood draw, regardless of any medical emergency.  Given McNeely’s rejection of 
hospitalization as sufficient ground for exigency and Schmerber’s limited holding 
that a traffic accident can create circumstances giving police no time to secure a 
warrant, the Mitchell court’s holding is wholly unsupported. 
Perhaps recognizing that a hospital visit alone has been declared insufficient 
to create an exigency, the plurality attempts to liken all DUI investigations of 
unconscious suspects to the situation in Schmerber.  Because a driver so drunk as to 
become unconscious is particularly likely to cause a traffic accident, Mitchell argues, 
circumstances similar to those creating a Schmerber-type exigency will be common 
when a DUI suspect is unconscious.  This justification strains credulity.  Mitchell 
was not involved in a traffic accident.  Police did not even arrest him in his vehicle.  
Any time an unconscious driver actually creates a traffic accident, police will be 
justified under Schmerber to conduct a warrantless blood draw if the circumstances 
make obtaining a warrant unreasonable.  Permitting warrantless blood draws on 
unconscious DUI suspects who do not cause traffic accidents because the Platonic-
ideal unconscious suspect is, in a vacuum, likely to cause one is faulty logic.  Take 
an example based on a similar justification: (1) police have probable cause to believe 
a suspect unlawfully possesses controlled substances; (2) the suspect owns a car; (3) 
car-owning suspects are more likely to transport drugs in their cars; and (4) police 
may search a vehicle without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe 
the car contains evidence of a crime.44  Under Mitchell’s logic, police should be able 
to search the suspect without a warrant pursuant to the automobile exception, even 
if the suspect never stepped in their vehicle, simply because it was likely that other 
suspects like them would.  Because the suspect belongs to a class likely to potentially 
fall within a warrant exception under other circumstances, Mitchell’s logic would 
permit a warrantless search based on that speculation.  This type of assumptive, cart-
 
 43 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 145–46. 
 44 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). 
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before-the-horse application of warrant exceptions does not pass constitutional 
muster. 
CONCLUSION 
Police may conduct a warrantless blood draw when the exigencies of a 
particular situation create a compelling need and there is no time to secure a 
warrant.45  The Supreme Court has found that such an exigency may, depending on 
the circumstances, arise in the course of investigating DUI causing a serious traffic 
accident where police are confronted with health and safety concerns.46  In Mitchell, 
a plurality of Justices greatly extended these holdings to permit warrantless blood 
draws in nearly all DUI investigations where a suspect is unconscious. 
Without support, the Mitchell plurality replaces exigency-created compelling 
need with a compelling interest in combating certain criminal activity.  Under this 
interpretation, the government need not determine that exigent circumstances 
compel a warrantless search if the criminal activity being investigated is particularly 
onerous.  The plurality strips its precedent of the requirement to evaluate the specific 
circumstances and crafts a new and overbroad warrant exception for an entire class 
of suspects.  Six years after the Supreme Court found by implication that a hospital 
visit was insufficient to excuse the warrant requirement in McNeely, the plurality 
finds all unconscious DUI suspects are subject to warrantless blood draws solely 
because they need to be taken to the hospital.  The plurality’s post hoc justification 
that unconscious suspects are more likely to cause traffic accidents assumes too 
much, proves illogical, and only emphasizes how unnecessary its expansive holding 
truly is. 
Benjamin Franklin famously wrote: “Those who would give up essential 
Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.”47  
As American drivers and pedestrians, we should be comforted by evolutions in the 
law keeping us and those we love safe from dangerous criminal activity.  As 
American citizens enjoying the freedoms our Constitution provides, we should be 
alarmed when the liberties we hold most dear are compromised.  
 
 45 See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 148–49. 
 46 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–71 (1966). 
 47 Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor (Nov. 11, 1755), in 6 THE PAPERS OF 
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 238, 242 (Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1963) 
